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Abstract
Recent research finds CNN models for image classification demonstrate overlapped
adversarial vulnerabilities: adversarial attacks can mislead CNN models with small
perturbations, which can effectively transfer between different models trained
on the same dataset. Adversarial training, as a general robustness improvement
technique, eliminates the vulnerability in a single model by forcing it to learn
robust features. The process is hard, often requires models with large capacity,
and suffers from significant loss on clean data accuracy. Alternatively, ensemble
methods are proposed to induce sub-models with diverse outputs against a transfer
adversarial example, making the ensemble robust against transfer attacks even
if each sub-model is individually non-robust. Only small clean accuracy drop
is observed in the process. However, previous ensemble training methods are
not efficacious in inducing such diversity and thus ineffective on reaching robust
ensemble. We propose DVERGE, which isolates the adversarial vulnerability in
each sub-model by distilling non-robust features, and diversifies the adversarial
vulnerability to induce diverse outputs against a transfer attack. The novel diversity
metric and training procedure enables DVERGE to achieve higher robustness
against transfer attacks comparing to previous ensemble methods, and enables the
improved robustness when more sub-models are added to the ensemble.
1 Introduction
Recent discoveries of adversarial attacks cast doubt on the inherent robustness of convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) [1, 2, 3]. These attacks, commonly referred to as adversarial examples,
comprise precisely crafted input perturbations that are often imperceptible to humans yet consistently
induce misclassification in CNN models. Moreover, previous research has demonstrated widespread
transferability of adversarial examples, wherein adversarial examples generated against an arbitrary
model can reliably mislead other unspecified deep learning models trained with the same dataset [4,
5, 6]. Ilyas et al. [5] conjecture the existence of robust and non-robust features within standard image
classification datasets. Whereas humans may understand an image via “human-meaningful” robust
features, which usually are insensitive to small additive noise, deep learning models are more prone
to learning non-robust features. Non-robust features are highly correlated with output labels and help
improve clean accuracy but are not visually meaningful and are sensitive to noise. Such dependency
on non-robust features leads to adversarial vulnerability that is exploited by adversarial examples
to mislead CNN models. Moreover, Ilyas et al. empirically show that CNN models independently
trained on the same dataset tend to capture similar non-robust features, demonstrating overlapping
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Figure 1: Decision regions in the `∞ ball around the same testing image learned by ensembles
of 3 ResNet-20 models trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. Same color indicates the same predicted
label. The vertical axis is along the adversarial direction of a surrogate benign ensemble, and the
horizontal axis is along a random Rademacher vector. The same axes are used for each subplot.
Adversarial vulnerability can be inferred from the closest decision boundary and corresponding
class. The baseline ensemble is achieved via standard training on clean data while the bottom
ensemble is trained with DVERGE. More plots of this nature can be seen in Appendix C.1.
vulnerability [5]. This property can be observed from the example in the upper row of Figure 1,
where an ensemble is trained on clean data and each of its sub-models are vulnerable along the same
axis of a transfer attack. This similarity is key to the high transferability of adversarial attacks [5, 7].
Extensive research has been conducted to improve the robustness of CNN models against adversarial
attacks, most notably adversarial training [3]. Adversarial training minimizes the loss of a CNN
model on online-generated adversarial examples against itself at each training step. This process
forces the model to prefer robust to non-robust features and thereby largely eliminates the model’s
vulnerability. Nevertheless, learning robust features is hard, so adversarial training often leads to a
significant increase in the generalization error on clean testing data [8].
Similar to traditional ensemble methods like bagging [9] and boosting [10], which train an ensemble
of weak learners with diverse predictions to improve overall accuracy, a recent line of research
proposes to train an ensemble of individually non-robust sub-models that produce diverse outputs
against transferred adversarial examples [11, 12, 13]. Intuitively, the approach can defend against
black-box transfer attacks as an attack can succeed only when multiple sub-models converge towards
the same wrong prediction [13]. Such an ensemble could also hypothetically achieve high clean
accuracy since the training process doesn’t exclude non-robust features. Various ensemble training
methods have been explored, such as diversifying output logits’ distributions [11, 12] or minimizing
the cosine similarity between the input gradient direction of each sub-model [13]. Yet empirical
results show that these diversity metrics are not very effective at inducing output diversity among
sub-models, and thus the corresponding ensemble can hardly attain the desired robustness [14].
We note that black-box transfer attacks are prevalent in real-world applications where model pa-
rameters are not exposed to end users [6, 13]. Moreover, high clean accuracy is always desirable.
We therefore seek an effective training method that mitigates attack transferability while maintain-
ing high clean accuracy. Based on a close investigation of the cause of adversarial vulnerability
in sub-models, we propose to distill the features learned by each sub-model corresponding to its
vulnerability to adversarial examples and use the overlap between the distilled features to measure
the diversity between sub-models. As adversarial examples exploit the vulnerability of sub-models, a
small overlap between sub-models indicates that a successful adversarial example on one sub-model
is unlikely to fool the other sub-model. Consequently, our method impedes attack transferability
between sub-models and leads to diverse outputs against a transferred adversarial example. Based
on this diversity metric, we propose Diversifying Vulnerabilities for Enhanced Robust Generation
of Ensembles (DVERGE), which uses a round-robin training procedure to distill and diversify the
features corresponding to each sub-model’s vulnerability. The proposed ensemble training method
makes the following contributions:
• DVERGE can successfully isolate and diversify the vulnerability in each sub-model such
that within-ensemble attack transferability is nearly eliminated;
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• DVERGE can significantly improve the overall robustness of the ensemble against black-box
transfer attacks without significantly impacting the clean accuracy;
• The diversity induced by DVERGE consistently improves robustness as the number of
ensemble sub-models increases under equivalent evaluation conditions.
As shown in the bottom row of Figure 1, diverse vulnerabilities allowed to persist in each sub-model
for high clean accuracy by DVERGE combine to yield an ensemble robust to transfer attacks. Our
method can also be augmented with the adversarial training objective to yield an ensemble with
both satisfying white-box robustness and higher clean accuracy compared to exclusively adversarial
training. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to utilize distilled features for training
diverse ensembles and quantitatively relate it to the robustness against adversarial attacks.
2 Related work
Adversarial attack and defense. The pervasiveness of adversarial examples highlights the vul-
nerability of modern CNN systems to malicious inputs. An adversarial attack usually applies an
additive perturbation δ subject to some constraint S to an original input x to form the adversarial
example xadv = x + δ. The goal of the attack is to find δ so that xadv can maximize the loss
Lθ of some CNN model with parameters θ w.r.t. x’s true label y. The attacker’s objective can be
formulated as xadv = x+ argmaxδ∈S Lθ(x+ δ, y). The constraint S typically ensures adversarial
examples are visually indistinguishable from original inputs, which is often defined as ||δ||p≤ 
for some perturbation strength  and `p-norm, e.g. p = 0 [15], p = 2 [2], or p = ∞ [1, 3]. In this
work, we focus on the attack bounded by the `∞ norm, which has become increasingly common in
recent attack and defense research studies. Madry et al. [3] show that the attacker’s objective can be
effectively optimized in a multi-step projected gradient descent (PGD) manner, where in each step
of the gradient update the achieved adversarial example is projected back into the constraint set S
to make sure it complies with the `∞ norm constraint. The attack can be further strengthened via
application of a random starting point [3] or consideration of the gradient’s momentum information
during the optimization [16, 17].
Various empirical methods have been investigated for improving model robustness. Among the-
ses methods, adversarial training [3] has gained prominence for its reliability and effectiveness.
Adversarial training generates adversarial examples while concurrently training CNN model(s) to
minimize the loss on these adversarial examples. The objective of adversarial training is formulated
as a min-max optimization: minθ E(x,y)∼D[maxδ∈S Lθ(x + δ, y)], where the inner maximization
is often conducted with PGD attacks for greater robustness [3]. Although recent research shows
that PGD adversarial training encourages a model to capture robust features within datasets [5], the
process is difficult and costly. The learning of robust feature detrimentally and significantly affects
the accuracy of the model on clean data [8], and the model architecture needs to be much larger in
order to compensate for the added complexity of the objective [3].
Ensemble of diverse sub-models for robustness. Besides training a single robust model, a recent
line of work investigates improving the robustness of an ensemble of small sub-models (especially
against transfer adversarial attacks). Such robust ensembles can be obtained not only by combining
individually robust sub-models but also by eliminating adversarial vulnerabilities shared by different
sub-models, be they robust or non-robust, so that attacks cannot transfer between the sub-models
within the ensemble. Several works attempt to promote diversity in internal representations or outputs
across sub-models to serve as a mechanism to limit adversarial transferability and improve ensemble
robustness. Pang et al. [12] propose the ADP regularizer, which forces different sub-models to have
high diversity in the non-maximal predictions. Kariyappa et al. [13] reduce the overlap between
“Adversarial Subspaces” [18] of different sub-models by maximizing the cosine distance between
each sub-model’s gradient w.r.t. the input. Although the ideas behind these methods are intuitive for
improving sub-model diversity, these diversity metrics do not in practice align well with diversifying
the adversarial vulnerability shared by different sub-models. Thus training the ensemble with these
diversity metrics does not lead to satisfying robustness against transferability between sub-models,
and consequently the resulted ensemble is still highly non-robust [14]. An ensemble diversity metric
that can effectively lead to low attack transferability and high overall robustness is still lacking.
3
3 Method
3.1 Vulnerability diversity metric
A recent study [5] reveals that non-robust features captured by deep learning models are highly
sensitive to additive noise, which is the main cause of adversarial vulnerability in CNN models.
Based on this observation, we propose to isolate the vulnerability of CNN models based on their
distilled non-robust features. Let us take a CNN model fi trained on dataset D as an example. We
consider a target input-label pair (x, y) ∈ D and another randomly-chosen independent source pair
(xs, ys) ∈ D. Corresponding to the source image xs, the distilled feature of the input image x by the
l-th layer of fi can be approximated with the feature distillation objective as [5]:
x′f li (x, xs) = argminz
∥∥f li (z)− f li (x)∥∥22 , s.t. ||z − xs||∞≤ , (1)
where f li (·) denotes the output before the activation (e.g. ReLU) of the l-th hidden layer. This
constrained optimization objective can then be optimized with PGD [3]. The distilled feature is
expected to be visually similar to xs rather than x but classified as the target class y since the same
feature will be extracted from x′
f li
and x by fi. Such misalignment between the visual similarity and
the classification result shows that x′
f li
reflects the adversarial vulnerability of fi when classifying x.
Therefore, we define the vulnerability diversity between two models fi and fj as:
d(fi, fj) :=
1
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E(x,y),(xs,ys),l
[
Lfi
(
x′f lj (x, xs), y
)
+ Lfj
(
x′f li (x, xs), y
)]
. (2)
HereLf (x, y) denotes the cross-entropy loss of model f for an input-label pair (x, y). The expectation
is taken over the independent uniformly random choices of (x, y) ∈ D, (xs, ys) ∈ D, and layer
l of models fi and fj . Since the distilled feature has the same dimension as input images, this
formulation can be evaluated on models with arbitrary architectures trained on the same dataset. As
x′
f li
(x, xs) is visually uncorrelated with y, the cross entropy loss Lfj (x′f li (x, xs), y) is small only
if fj’s vulnerability on x’s non-robust features overlaps with that of fi, and vice versa. So the
formulation in Equation (2) effectively measures the vulnerability overlap between the two models.
Note that the feature distillation process in Equation (1) can be considered a special case of generating
an adversarial example from source image xs with target label y. The diversity defined in Equation (2)
therefore corresponds to the attack success rate when transferring adversarial examples between the
two models in the same way as training cross-entropy loss corresponds to training accuracy.
3.2 Vulnerability diversification objective
As adversarial attacks are less likely to transfer between models with high vulnerability diversity,
we propose to apply the metric defined in Equation (2) as an objective during the ensemble training
to induce diverse sub-models and block transfer attacks. Equation (3) shows a straightforward way
to incorporate the diversity metric into the training objective, where for each sub-model fi, the
diversity between itself and all other sub-models fj in the ensemble is maximized when minimizing
the original cross-entropy loss:
min
fi
E(x,y)[Lfi(x, y)]− α
∑
j 6=i
d(fi, fj). (3)
As the formulation of d(fi, fj) has no upper bound, directly maximizing it may ultimately lead to
divergence. Thus, we revise the training objective as
min
fi
E(x,y)
Lfi(x, y) + α∑
j 6=i
E(xs,ys),l
[
Lfi
(
x′f lj (x, xs), ys
)] , (4)
which has a stronger bound than Equation (3). The new objective not only encourages the increase of
vulnerability diversity but also facilitates the correct classification of the distilled image as ys. As
such, the objective is well-posed and can be effectively optimized.
Furthermore, it should be noted that minimizing Lfi(x′f lj (x, xs), ys) can effectively contribute to the
minimization of Lfi(xs, ys) as the distilled image x′f lj (x, xs) is close to the clean image xs. Previous
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adversarial training research [3, 19] also show that it is not necessary to include the clean data loss in
the objective. So we further simplify Equation (4) to
min
fi
E(x,y),(xs,ys),l
∑
j 6=i
Lfi(x′f lj (x, xs), ys), (5)
which is adopted for training individual sub-models in DVERGE. The objective in Equation (5) can
be understood as training sub-model fi with the adversarial examples generated for other sub-models.
However, DVERGE is fundamentally different from adversarial training. Adversarial training process
constantly trains a model on white-box attacks against itself and forces the model to capture the
robust feature of the dataset. In DVERGE, Equation (5) can be minimized if fi utilizes a different
set of features from other sub-models, including non-robust features. As non-robust features are
distributed more commonly in dataset than robust features [5], capturing and integrating some non-
robust features allows DVERGE to reach higher clean accuracy compared to adversarial training. Our
training process should also be distinguished from that of Tramer et al. [20], which trains a single
model with adversarial examples transferred from an ensemble of static pretrained sub-models for
improving robustness. In DVERGE, all the sub-models in the ensemble are being optimized with
Equation (5) in a round-robin fashion. The procedure dynamically maximizes the diversity of every
pair of sub-models, rather than forcing only a single model away from static pretrained sub-models.
The entire training process of DVERGE is elaborated in Section 3.3.
3.3 DVERGE training routine
Algorithm 1 DVERGE training routine for a N -sub-model ensemble.
1: # initialization and pretraining
2: for i = 1, . . . , N do
3: Randomly initialize sub-model fi
4: Pretrain fi with clean dataset
5: # round-robin feature diversification
6: for e = 1, . . . , E do
7: Uniformly randomly choose layer l for feature distillation
8: for b = 1, . . . , B do
9: (X,Y )← get batched input-label pairs
10: (Xs, Ys)← uniformly sample batched source input-label pairs
11: # get distilled batch for each model
12: for i = 1, . . . , N do
13: X ′i := x
′
fli
(X,Xs)← non-robust feature distillation with Equation (1)
14: # calculate loss and perform SGD update for all sub-models
15: for i = 1, . . . , N do
16: ∇fi ← ∇[
∑
j 6=i Lfi(fi(X ′j), Ys)]
17: fi ← fi − lr · ∇fi
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for training an ensemble of N sub-models. We first randomly
initialize and pretrain all the sub-models based on the clean dataset so that their feature spaces will
be useful and we do not waste time diversifying irrelevant features. Then for each batch of training
data during the diverse training phase, we randomly sample another batch of source data and use
them to distill the non-robust feature following the objective of Equation (1). A PGD optimization
scheme is applied in the feature distillation process. Round-robin training is then employed wherein
a single stochastic gradient descent step is performed on each sub-model with the distilled images
from all other sub-models and their source labels, as stated in the objective in Equation (5). This
training process is performed on all B batches of training data and repeated for E epochs. The layer
l for the feature distillation is randomly chosen in each epoch to avoid overfitting to the features of a
particular layer. This training routine can effectively increase the vulnerability diversity between each
pair of sub-models within the ensemble and block within-ensemble transfer attacks. Consequently,
the overall black-box robustness of the ensemble improves.
DVERGE induces a similar training complexity as adversarial training does. Both of these methods
need extra back propagations to either distill non-robust features or find adversarial examples.
However, DVERGE uses only intermediate features rather than final outputs for distillation so it
is marginally faster than adversarial training. Detailed comparison of the training complexity of
DVERGE vs. previous methods can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: The trend of diversity and transferability during the training of DVERGE. The
results are rolling averaged with a window size of 30.
Figure 3: Pair-wise transferability (in the form of attack success rate) among sub-models
for different ensemble methods.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Setup
We compare DVERGE with various counterparts, including Baseline which trains an ensemble in a
standard way and two previous robust ensemble training methods: ADP [12] and GAL [13]. For a
fair comparison, we use ResNet-20 [21] as sub-models and average the output probabilities after the
soft-max layer of each sub-model to yield the final predictions of ensembles. All the evaluations are
performed on the CIFAR-10 dataset [22]. Training configuration details can be found in Appendix A.
For DVERGE, we use PGD with momentum [23] to perform the feature distillation in Equation (1).
We conduct 10 steps of gradient descent during feature distillation with a step size of /10. The
 used for each ensemble size to achieve the results in this section was empirically chosen for the
highest diversity and lowest transferability, such that  = 0.07, 0.05, 0.05 for ensembles with 3, 5,
and 8 sub-models, respectively. Analysis on the effect of  is given in Appendix B.
4.2 Diversity and transferability within the ensemble
The objective of DVERGE is to guide sub-models to capture diverse non-robust features and minimize
the vulnerability overlap between sub-models, thereby reducing the attack transferability within the
ensemble. To validate our method, we measure diversity and transferability by randomly picking
1,000 test samples on which all sub-models initially give correct predictions. We compute the
pair-wise diversity as the expected cross-entropy loss formulated in Equation (2), which is further
averaged across all pairs of sub-models to obtain the diversity measurement of the whole ensemble.
When measuring the transferability, we generate untargeted adversarial examples using 50-step PGD
with a step size of /5 and five random starts. The transferability is measured by the attack success
rate which counts any misclassification as a success. Similar to diversity, the averaged pair-wise
attack success rate is used to indicate the level of transferability within the ensemble.
First, let’s take a look at how the diversity and transferability within the ensemble changes during
the training process of DVERGE. Figure 2 shows the result of an ensemble of three sub-models.
The diversity is evaluated using the same  of 0.07 as during the training, and the transferability is
measured using the standard  of 0.03 (≈ 8/255) for adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10 [3]. The figure
clearly shows that the diversity increases while the transferability decreases as the training proceeds.
This trend empirically validates that minimizing the DVERGE objective can effectively lead to a
higher diversity and a lower adversarial transferability within an ensemble.
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Figure 4: Robustness results for different ensemble methods. The number after the slash
stands for the number of sub-models.
Figure 3 presents the pair-wise transferability of an ensemble with three sub-models tested under
the same  as aforementioned. Results for the ensembles composed of more sub-models and for
other testing  are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C.2, respectively. The number at the
intersection of the i-th row and j-th column represents the transfer success rate of the adversarial
examples generated from the i-th sub-model and tested on the j-th sub-model. When i = j, the
number becomes the white-box attack success rate. Larger off-diagonal numbers indicate greater
transferability across sub-models. Compared with other ensemble methods, DVERGE suppresses
the transferability to a much lower level; among all adversarial examples that successfully break
one sub-model, only 3-6% of them could lead to misclassification on other sub-models. Although
ADP and GAL also strive to improve the diversity for better robustness, they cannot effectively
block adversarial transfer. ADP exhibits transference of 60% to 70% of attacks between sub-models.
When it comes to GAL, two out of the three sub-models are still extremely vulnerable to each other,
where more than 80% of adversarial examples can successfully transfer between the first and second
sub-models. Our evaluation demonstrates that stopping attack transfers is not trivial and applying an
appropriate diversification metric is crucial. Therefore, we advocate the use of DVERGE as a more
effective means for mitigating the attack transferability within an ensemble.
4.3 Robustness of the ensemble
We evaluate the robustness of ensembles under two threat models: black-box transfer adversary,
where the attackers cannot access the model parameters and rely on surrogate models to generate
transferable adversarial examples, and white-box adversary, where the attackers have the full access
of everything of the model. Under the black-box scenario, we use hold-out baseline ensembles with
3, 5, and 8 ResNet-20 sub-models as the surrogate models. A more challenging setting considers an
attacker fully aware of the defense such that the surrogate ensemble is trained with the exact technique.
The results under this setting can be seen in Appendix C.3. We use three attack methodologies:
(1) PGD with momentum [23] with three random starts. (2) M-DI2- FGSM [24], which randomly
resizes and pads the image in each step of attack generation. (3) SGM [25], which adds weight to the
gradient through the skip connections of ResNets. The latter two attacks are essentially two stronger
black-box transfer attacks that can better expose the attack transferability between models. For more
details, we refer the reader to the attacks’ respective papers. We run each attack for 100 iterations with
the step size of /5. Other than using the cross-entropy loss, we also generate adversarial examples
with CW loss [2] since it can also help with the transfer. As a result, in total, each sample will have
3 (surrogate models)×5 (PGD with 3 random starts plus 2 other attacks)×2 (loss functions) = 30
adversarial counterparts. The black-box accuracy is reported in a all-or-nothing fashion: We say the
model is accurate on one sample only if all of its 30 adversarial versions are correctly classified by
the model. We adopt such a powerful adversary and a strict criteria to give a tighter upper bound of
the robustness against black-box transfer attacks. Under the white-box scenario, we use 50-step PGD
with the step size of /5 to attack ensembles. Five random starts are included. Our experiment shows
that we have applied sufficient steps for attacks to converge (Appendix D).
Evaluated on 1,000 randomly selected test samples, Figure 4 shows the black-box and white-box
robustness of ensembles with various number of sub-models across a wide range of attack budget
. We refer the reader to Appendix C.3 for numerical results. DVERGE, even with the least sub-
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Figure 5: Results for DVERGE combined with adversarial training.
models, outperforms each case of the other methods with higher accuracy in both black-box and
white-box settings and achieves comparable clean accuracy. In addition, robustness improvement
can be easily obtained by adding more sub-models into the ensemble when using our method, while
such a satisfying trend is less obvious in other methods. GAL, as the second best performing
approach among the four methods, actually shares the same high-level concept as the proposed
DVERGE algorithm. They both aim at diversifying the vulnerabilities shared by the sub-models. The
difference lies in the fact that GAL considers using the adversarial gradient directions to evaluate the
vulnerability of CNN models whereas DVERGE identifies the vulnerability in a model by distilling
the learnt non-robust features. Results from both Figure 3 and Figure 4 suggest that our approach is a
more effective realization of the intuition of identifying and diversifying adversarial vulnerability.
4.4 DVERGE with adversarial training
Although DVERGE achieves the highest robustness among ensemble methods, its robustness against
white-box attacks and transfer attacks with a large perturbation strength is still quite low. This result
is expected because the objective of DVERGE is to diversify the adversarial vulnerability rather than
completely eliminate it. In other words, vulnerability inevitably exists within sub-models and can be
captured by attacks with larger . One straightforward way to improve the robustness of ensembles is
to augment DVERGE with adversarial training [3]. We describe implementation details regarding
adversarial training in Appendix A and the amended objective in Appendix C.4.
Figure 5 presents the black-box and white-box accuracy for adversarial training (AdvT), DVERGE
only (DVERGE) and the combination of the two (DVERGE+AdvT) using the same evaluation setting
as in Section 4.3. Ensembles with 5 sub-models are used here. More results with different ensemble
sizes can be found in Appendix C.4. The DVERGE+AdvT objective favors the capture of more
robust features by the ensemble. Compared to AdvT, DVERGE+AdvT encourages the ensemble to
learn diverse non-robust features alongside robust features, leading to a higher clean accuracy and
higher robustness against transfer attacks. In the meantime, no matter which objective is applied,
the overall learning capacity of the ensemble remains the same. That is, learning more robust
features will leave less capacity in the ensemble to capture diverse non-robust features, and vice
versa. Forcing the inclusion of robust features causes DVERGE+AdvT to sacrifice the accuracy on
clean examples comparing to performing DVERGE only. Learning diverse non-robust features harms
DVERGE+AdvT’s robustness against white-box attacks with larger perturbations compared to AdvT
alone. These results can be seen as an evidence for the recent findings in [5, 8] regarding the tradeoff
between clean accuracy and robustness. DVERGE+AdvT can effectively explore such tradeoff by
changing the ratio between the two objectives, which is further illustrated in Appendix C.4.
5 Conclusions
In this work we propose DVERGE, a CNN ensemble training method that isolates and diversifies
the adversarial vulnerability in each sub-model to improve the overall robustness against transfer
attacks without significantly reducing clean accuracy. We show that adversarial diversity in a CNN
model can be successfully characterized by distilled non-robust features, from which we can measure
the vulnerability diversity between two models. The diversity metric is further developed into the
vulnerability diversification objective used for DVERGE ensemble training. We empirically show
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that training with DVERGE objective can effectively increase the vulnerability diversity between
sub-models, thereby blocking attack transferability within the ensemble. In this way DVERGE
reduces the success rate of transfer attacks between sub-models from more than 60% achieved
by previous ensemble training methods to less than 6%, which enables ensembles trained with
DVERGE to achieve significantly higher robustness against both black-box transfer attacks and
white-box attacks compared to previous ensemble training methods. The robustness can be further
improved with additional sub-models in the ensemble. We further demonstrate that DVERGE can be
augmented with an adversarial training objective, which enables the ensemble to achieve higher clean
accuracy and higher transfer attack robustness compared to adversarial training. In conclusion, the
vulnerability diversity induced by DVERGE training objective can effectively contribute to enhancing
the robustness of CNN ensembles while maintaining desirable clean accuracy.
Broader Impact
DVERGE hypothetically addresses some black-box adversarial vulnerabilities pervasive across
machine learning applications while increasing compute requirements to training models. As such
methods presented herein suggest potential impacts on the reliability, security, and carbon-footprint
of deep-neural-network-based systems. The reliability and robustness of machine learning systems
are not just a concern for practitioners but also policy makers [26].
A net increase in carbon production would be considered a negative impact by many researchers
in climate-related fields. This problem is common to many techniques that modify model training
to achieve robustness, including DVERGE. While yet to be examined in the case of DVERGE,
the possibility to mitigate or reduce excessive training burdens through informed hyperparameter
selection exists. Sometimes, though modified training may increase the required computation per
model parameter update, the modified method may nevertheless require fewer steps or epochs to
achieve desirable results. Recent work provides actionable recommendations, such as performing
cost-benefit analysis, to determine if efficient downstream adoption is desirable [27].
In both industrial and military applications, practical solutions to vulnerabilities, such as relying on
human-AI teaming [28], are effective but do not address the underlying source of vulnerability and
may limit the adoption of machine learning elsewhere. Addressing vulnerabilities at the training
stage, then, is a desirable capability for positive-impact applications. By orthogonally improving
only black-box robustness, though, we leave machine learning systems vulnerable to other types of
attacks. Previous work has shown that white-box knowledge can still be leaked in black-box scenarios
[29, 30]. As such, DVERGE is reliant on adversarial training to defend against white-box attacks and
on traditional computer security to maintain system integrity. The ultimate interpretation of impact
due to improved model reliability and security is not clear-cut, however, as it is highly dependent
on the application space. This uncertainty is symptomatic of the fact that machine learning is often
fundamental by nature and that there is no machine learning technique for improving robustness
that can be applied only to positive-impact applications, whatever one’s subjective interpretation of
“positive” may be.
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A Training and implementation details
We train the baseline ensembles for 200 epochs using SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay
0.0001. The initial learning rate is 0.1, and we decay it by 10× at the 100-th and the 150-th
epochs. Any models pre-trained on the clean dataset can serve as the starting point for the training of
DVERGE. In our implementation, DVERGE starts from the trained baseline ensembles. We follow
the aforementioned learning rate schedule, but using a carefully-tuned one is likely to bring extra
performance gain. We reproduce ADP [12] and GAL [13] according to either the released code or the
paper with recommended hyperparameters and setups. Specifically, they both use Adam optimizer
[31] with an initial learning rate of 0.001. Also note that GAL requires the ReLU function to be
replaced with leaky ReLU to avoid gradient vanishing. The other configurations stay the same as
those of baseline ensembles.
Ensembles with adversarial training follow the baseline’s training setup. We use 10-step PGD with
 = 8/255 and a step size α = 2/255 [3]. More specifically, adversarial examples w.r.t. the whole
ensemble are generated in each step of the training process and are used to update model parameters.
When combining DVERGE with adversarial training, however, adversarial examples are generated
on each sub-model instead of the whole ensemble. We empirically find these choices help each case
achieve its best robustness.
We use 0.5 as the input transformation probability for M-DI2- FGSM [24] and 0.2 as the γ for SGM
[25] when generating these two attacks as recommended by their respective papers.
All models are implemented and trained with PyTorch [32] on a single NVIDIA TITAN XP GPU.
Evaluation is performed based on AdverTorch [33]. As shown in Table 1, the training of DVERGE is
marginally faster than that of adversarial training (AdvT). As they both need extra back propagations
to either distill non-robust features or find adversarial examples, DVERGE uses only intermediate
features for distillation while adversarial training requires the information back propagated from the
final output. As for previous methods, though ADP requires the least time budget, it does not improve
the robustness much as shown in Figure 4. And the significantly improved robustness would be worth
the extra training cost of DVERGE over GAL. In addition, according to Figure 2, DVERGE could
reduce the transferability within the ensemble at the very early stage of the training, so later training
epochs have the potential to be simplified to a fine-tuning process without diversity loss, which will
require much less training time. Further mitigating the computational overhead of DVERGE would
be one of our future goals.
Table 1: Training time comparison on a single TITAN XP GPU. All times are evaluated for training a
ResNet-20 ensemble with 3 sub-models for 200 epochs.
Method Baseline ADP [12] GAL [13] AdvT [3] DVERGE
Training time (h) 1.0 2.0 7.5 11.5 10.5
B Analysis on the training  of DVERGE
Table 2: The effect of  on optimizing the feature distillation objective in Equation (1) and the
resulting diversity loss measured with Equation (5). fi and fj are two ResNet-20 models trained in a
standard way on CIFAR-10. x′
f li
is short for x′
f li
(x, xs). The step size used for feature distillation is
chosen as /#steps.
 #steps feature distillation objective diversity loss
E
(x,y),(xs,ys),l
∥∥∥f li (x′fli )− f li (x)∥∥∥2 E(x,y),(xs,ys),l
[
Lfj (x′fli , ys)
]
0.03 10 1.056 1.726
0.05 10 0.793 3.302
0.07 10 0.703 4.738
One important hyperparameter of DVERGE is the  used for feature distillation. This section provides
some initial exploration on the effect of using different . We start by looking at how  affects the
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optimization of the feature distillation in Equation (1) and the resulted diversity loss in Equation (5).
The results evaluated with 1,000 CIFAR-10 testing images on two pre-trained ResNet-20 models
are shown in Table 2. We find that a larger  enables more accurate feature distillation as a smaller
distance between the internal representation of the distilled image x′
f li
and the target image x is
achieved. As a result, the distilled image from model fi can lead to a higher diversity loss on
another model fj , which intuitively encourages the training routine of DVERGE to enforce a greater
diversity and therefore a lower transferability between the two models. We empirically confirm
this intuition in Figure 6, where we vary the training  and measure the transferability between
sub-models. For instance, when ensembles have three sub-models, increasing  from 0.03 to 0.07
decreases the transferability from 8%-10% to 3%-6%. Interestingly, however, for ensembles with
five or eight sub-models, although we do observe a drop in the transferability between most of the
sub-model pairs by using a larger , some pairs of the sub-models remain highly vulnerable to one
another. In particular, observe that when training an ensemble of 5 sub-models with an  of 0.07, 79%
of adversarial examples from the second sub-model can fool the fourth one and 48% of examples
transfer in the reverse direction. We leave a thorough and rigorous analysis of this phenomenon to
future work.
Figure 6: Transferability within DVERGE ensembles trained with different . The evaluation setting
follows that of Figure 3, where the attack perturbation strength is 0.03.
Finally, we look at the clean accuracy and robustness achieved by DVERGE ensembles trained
with different . In Table 3, we observe that training with a larger  leads to a higher black-box
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transfer robustness but a lower clean accuracy. The trend between white-box robustness and  is
not monotonic though, which we suspect is related to the observation that the attack transferability
worsens between some pairs of sub-models under a larger training , as shown in Figure 6. As
the robustness against white-box attacks is not the main focus of DVERGE, we will explore the
relationship, both qualitatively and quantitatively, between the transferability among sub-models and
the achieved white-box robustness of the whole ensemble in the future.
Table 3: Robustness of DVERGE ensembles trained with different . In each table block, we
report (clean accuracy) / (black-box transfer accuracy under perturbation strength 0.03) / (white-box
accuracy under perturbation strength 0.01).
#sub-models
training  0.03 0.05 0.07
3 92.9% / 4.2% / 22.7% 92.7% / 26.6% / 32.3% 91.4% / 53.2% / 40.0%
5 92.3% / 30.5% / 43.1% 91.5% / 57.2% / 48.9% 90.2% / 66.5% / 42.3%
8 91.3% / 42.8% / 51.9% 91.1% / 63.6% / 57.9% 89.2% / 71.3% / 52.4%
C Additional results
C.1 Decision region visualization
We visualize the decision regions learned by DVERGE ensembles around more testing images from
the CIFAR-10 dataset in Figure 7.
C.2 Transferability within the ensemble under different testing 
In addition to Figure 3, we provide more results of the transferability between sub-models under
different attack  in Figure 8. In all cases, DVERGE achieves the lowest level of transferability
among all ensemble methods.
Table 4: Accuracy v.s.  against black-box transfer attacks generated from hold-out baseline en-
sembles. The number in the first column after the slash is the number of sub-models within the
ensemble.
 clean 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
baseline/3 94.1% 10.0% 0.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
baseline/5 94.4% 10.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
baseline/8 94.4% 9.3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/3 [12] 93.3% 22.7% 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/5 [12] 93.1% 22.8% 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/8 [12] 93.0% 21.4% 0.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
GAL/3 [13] 88.8% 78.2% 59.9% 39.7% 22.9% 10.4% 5.1% 1.8%
GAL/5 [13] 91.0% 78.1% 54.8% 32.4% 14.9% 6.0% 2.4% 0.5%
GAL/8 [13] 92.3% 75.1% 45.8% 22.4% 7.5% 2.0% 0.5% 0.1%
DVERGE/3 91.4% 83.9% 70.4% 53.2% 34.5% 19.1% 9.0% 2.7%
DVERGE/5 91.9% 83.4% 72.4% 57.2% 39.4% 23.5% 12.6% 4.6%
DVERGE/8 91.1% 86.6% 75.9% 63.6% 48.4% 33.1% 21.2% 9.5%
AdvT/3 [3] 76.7% 75.5% 73.8% 72.0% 70.3% 68.4% 65.1% 62.2%
AdvT/5 [3] 76.9% 75.8% 74.7% 72.7% 69.8% 67.8% 65.5% 62.4%
AdvT/8 [3] 79.7% 78.2% 76.2% 74.0% 71.1% 69.1% 66.8% 63.4%
DVERGE+AdvT/3 83.0% 80.6% 78.2% 76.2% 73.8% 70.1% 67.4% 63.4%
DVERGE+AdvT/5 84.5% 82.3% 80.4% 77.9% 75.3% 70.9% 66.4% 62.1%
DVERGE+AdvT/8 85.9% 83.1% 80.2% 77.1% 72.7% 68.0% 63.6% 56.5%
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Figure 7: More decision region plots of ensembles with 3 ResNet-20 trained on CIFAR-10. Each pair
of two rows is generated with one testing image. The first row is for the baseline ensemble, and the
second row is for the DVERGE ensemble. The axes are chosen in the same way as in Figure 1.
C.3 Numerical results for robustness
We report numerical results that correspond to Figure 4 and Figure 5 in Table 4 (black-box transfer
accuracy) and Table 5 (white-box accuracy), respectively. Note that ADP presents higher white-box
accuracy than black-box transfer accuracy in some cases, e.g., 4.4% > 0.5% for ADP/8 when  is
0.02, which implies ADP might result in obfuscated gradients [34].
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Figure 8: Transferability results under different testing .
Table 5: Accuracy v.s.  against white-box attacks. The number in the first column after the slash is
the number of sub-models within the ensemble.
 clean 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
baseline/3 94.1% 1.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
baseline/5 94.4% 2.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
baseline/8 94.4% 3.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/3 [12] 93.3% 9.6% 0.6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/5 [12] 93.1% 11.8% 1.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/8 [12] 93.0% 12.0% 4.4% 1.7% 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1%
GAL/3 [13] 88.8% 11.4% 0.2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
GAL/5 [13] 91.0% 31.7% 8.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0% 0%
GAL/8 [13] 92.3% 37.0% 8.7% 0.9% 0.1% 0% 0% 0%
DVERGE/3 91.4% 40.0% 12.2% 3.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0% 0%
DVERGE/5 91.9% 48.9% 21.8% 6.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0%
DVERGE/8 91.1% 57.9% 27.0% 10.7% 2.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0%
AdvT/3 [3] 76.7% 67.8% 58.4% 48.0% 35.6% 26.1% 17.5% 9.9%
AdvT/5 [3] 76.9% 68.8% 59.0% 48.1% 37.0% 26.4% 16.6% 9.7%
AdvT/8 [3] 79.7% 70.1% 60.5% 48.2% 36.4% 26.7% 17.0% 9.7%
DVERGE+AdvT/3 83.0% 72.9% 59.8% 44.0% 29.3% 18.8% 9.8% 4.7%
DVERGE+AdvT/5 84.5% 74.8% 59.8% 41.8% 27.1% 15.5% 7.3% 2.7%
DVERGE+AdvT/8 85.9% 72.5% 58.3% 39.8% 25.8% 13.9% 5.9% 2.7%
A more challenging scenario for adversarial defenses is assuming the attacker is fully aware of the
exact defense that the system relies on. In such case, the adversary can train an independent copy of
the defended network as the surrogate model. We report black-box transfer accuracy of each method
under this setting in Table 6. The same group of attacks as in Section 4.3 are used and ensembles
with 3, 5, and 8 sub-models form the collection of surrogate models. According to Table 6, DVERGE
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still presents the strongest robustness against such a powerful black-box transfer adversary among all
ensemble methods.
Table 6: Accuracy v.s.  against black-box transfer attacks generated from hold-out ensembles that
are trained with the exact defense technique used by each ensemble. The number in the first column
after the slash is the number of sub-models within the ensemble.
 clean 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
ADP/3 [12] 93.3% 34.7% 6.5% 1.4% 0.2% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/5 [12] 93.1% 34.2% 6.6% 1.6% 0.6% 0% 0% 0%
ADP/8 [12] 93.0% 32.5% 5.6% 1.4% 0.2% 0% 0% 0%
GAL/3 [13] 88.8% 67.8% 36.2% 13.8% 3.7% 0.6% 0.1% 0%
GAL/5 [13] 91.0% 67.5% 31.9% 9.2% 1.8% 0.3% 0% 0%
GAL/8 [13] 92.3% 64.7% 25.8% 5.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0% 0%
DVERGE/3 91.4% 75.4% 50.2% 23.8% 7.6% 2.1% 0.3% 0.2%
DVERGE/5 91.9% 77.2% 53.1% 26.7% 9.5% 2.6% 0.5% 0.2%
DVERGE/8 91.1% 77.7% 57.3% 32.0% 13.9% 3.8% 0.9% 0.2%
C.4 Discussion on DVERGE with adversarial training
Formally, the combined training objective of DVERGE and adversarial training is
min
fi
E(x,y),(xs,ys),l
λ ·
∑
j 6=i
Lfi(x′f lj (x, xs), ys)︸ ︷︷ ︸
DVERGE loss
+ max
δ∈S
Lfi(xs + δ, ys)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AdvT loss
 , (6)
where λ is a hyperparameter that balances between the two terms. We set λ = 1.0 to achieve the
results in Figure 5. Results for other ensemble sizes under λ = 1.0 are shown in Figure 9. The
observations stay the same as in Section 4.4. To better reflect the trade-off between clean accuracy
and robustness, we report the results for an ensemble of eight sub-models with λ = 0.5. In this case,
DVERGE loss is weighted less and the training process will favor adversarial training. In turn, the
ensemble spends more of its capacity to capture robust features instead of diverse non-robust features.
Consequently, compared with λ = 1.0, we observe a decrease in clean accuracy and an increase in
both black-box and white-box robustness when  is large. In addition, the ensemble size is actually
another weight factor in Equation (6) as increasing the number of sub-models will naturally lead to
larger DVERGE loss such that it outweighs the AdvT loss. As a result, larger (smaller) ensemble
sizes for DVERGE+AdvT results in better (worse) clean performance yet worse (better) black-box
and white-box robustness under a large . This assertion can be confirmed by the results in the bottom
three rows of Table 4 and Table 5.
D Convergence check
As suggested in [14, 35], we report accuracy vs. the number of attack iterations in Table 7. Note,
we use only one random start here for white-box attacks for efficiency. One can observe that using
more steps decreases the accuracy by no more than 0.6% for black-box attacks and no more than
1.2% for white-box attacks. Thus, we confirm sufficient steps have been applied and all attacks have
converged during the evaluation.
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Figure 9: Results for DVERGE combined with adversarial training.
Table 7: Accuracy against attacks with varying number of iterations.
black-box ( = 0.03) white-box ( = 0.01)
100 500 1000 50 500 1000
DVERGE/3 53.2% 52.6% 53.4% 42.7% 41.6% 41.5%
DVERGE/5 57.2% 56.9% 57.3% 50.4% 49.5% 49.5%
DVERGE/8 63.6% 63.6% 63.2% 58.0% 57.8% 57.8%
DVERGE+AdvT/3 76.2% 76.3% 76.2% 72.9% 72.9% 72.9%
DVERGE+AdvT/5 77.9% 78.0% 77.8% 74.8% 74.8% 74.8%
DVERGE+AdvT/8 77.1% 76.9% 77.4% 72.7% 72.7% 72.7%
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